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BAKER V. CARR




It was 1796 when the first apparent application of a politi-
cal question doctrine-that political matters are not justicia-
ble-was made by the Supreme Court of the United States.1
Chief Justice John Marshall first attempted to describe such a
doctrine in his momentous opinion on judicial review, Marbury
v. Madison, by stating that "questions in their nature political
... can never be made in this court."2
Yet it was perhaps an 1838 dissenting opinion of Chief
Justice Taney that led to the first dear exposition of the
doctrine. 3 Here the Court first accepted jurisdiction of a suit
by one state against another involving a disputed boundary
line. Taney dissented on the ground that Rhode Island was
attempting to secure a ruling on what was a political rather
than a properly judicial question. He felt that the court would
have had jurisdiction had rights of property, rather than rights
of sovereignty, been involved; but they were not.4 "He was
outvoted in this case, but he wrote the opinion in Luther v.
Borden5 ten years later, the famous decision in which the Court
refused to pass upon a political question." In issue here was
the disputed control of the government of Rhode Island dur-
ing Dorr's Rebellion, and which of two constitutions was the
state's organic law. The court held that this question was not
of a judicial nature; that it was a political question to be de-
termined by political departments of government.
The doctrine of nonjusticiability of political questions was
-A.B., M.A., LLB., Ph.D. in progress. Member, Virginia Bar, and formerly
Instructor in Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute.
I Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); See Schwartz, The Supreme
Court: Constitutional Revolution in Retrospect 372 (1957).
2 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
3 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
4 Id. at 752-754.
548 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
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upheld for over one hundred years until overthrown, at least
in the area of legislative apportionment, by Baker v. Carr. 6
A number of cases have reached the Court in the past
thirty years involving disparities in the influence of the voters,
caused by the placing or maintaining of unequal numbers of
citizens in districts which collectively have the same political
power. However, no clear line of constitutional development
toward a justiciability of districting can be found in studying
these decisions. As early as 1932 the Court did not hesitate
to act where state legislative power had been actively used to
produce inequality in congressional districts. 7 However, in
these cases the justiciability question did not arise. The Court
merely found that the federal Constitution did not invest state
redistricting with such special character as to shield it from
gubernatorial veto. 8
In 1932 the Court also held that there was then no federal
statutory restriction on states in their creation of congressional
districts for the election of members of the House of Repre-
sentatives.9 By statute in 1911 Congress had provided that
the representatives to the next Congress and each subsequent
Congress were to be elected by districts composed of continu-
ous and compact territory and containing as nearly as practi-
cable an equal number of inhabitants. A 1929 apportionment
statute had, however, failed to include this requirement. The
Supreme Court held that this omission was deliberate and that
a lack of compactness or equality did not render a Mississippi
redistricting law unconstitutional.
As the courts did not enforce any standard of equality on
states in the distribution of congressional representation, dis-
tricts in many states became entirely unequal in terms of popu-
lation within congressional districts. By 1946, Illinois was
said to have the worst apportionment, with the largest dis-
trict having 914,000 residents, the smallest, 112,000, and
6 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
7Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375
(1932); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
8 Smiley v. Holm, supra, note 7.
9 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
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considerable disparity to be noted among the others.lo
Illinois had refused to redistrict since 1901. Three Illinois
voters, in challenging the constitutionality of this arrangement,
asked a federal district court to restrain the Illinois Primary
Certifying Board from conducting an election under existing
laws. Upon dismissal, appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court. In the case of Colegrove v. Green," the Court dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that it "ought not to enter into
this political thicket" and that the "remedy for unfairness is
to secure state legislatures that will apportion properly, or to
invoke the ample powers of Congress."12
Having thus ruled that state apportionment of congressional
seats alloted to the state is a political matter, this decision be-
came a landmark case upon which the Court relied in deciding
attacks upon other state activities in the election arena. In
Colegrove v. Barrett, '-3 Illinois' state legislative apportionment
law was challenged under the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution; the legislature
had also not been reapportioned for more than forty-five
years and was now allegedly composed of grossly unequal
districts. At issue in MacDougall v. Green,' 4was the denial
by a district court of an injunction against the enforcement of
an Illinois Election Code section which required that a nomi-
nating petition of a new political party bear the signatures of
25,000 qualified voters, including 200 valid signatures from
each of at least fifty of the state's 102 counties. Barrett was
dismissed, while a dismissal in MacDougall was affirmed with-
out further consideration of the question of justiciability.
In South v. Peters, Ir after a federal district court had refused
under the authority of Colegrove v. Green to grant equitable
relief against the Georgia County-Unit System,,6 the court
10 Note, Reapportionment of Congressional Districts in Illinois, 41 ILL. L.
REV. 578 (1947).
"1328 U.S. 549 (1946).
12 Id. at 556.
13 330 U.S. 804 (1947).
14335 U.S. 281 (1948).
15 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
16 Turman v. Duckworth, 68 F.Supp. 744 (N.D. Ga. 1946); aff'd per curiam,
329 U.S. 675 (1946); Cook v. Fortson, 68 F.Supp. 624 (N.D. Ga. 1946).
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was asked to invalidate the system. This mechanism weighted
votes in statewide and congressional elections, giving con-
siderably less power to voters in more heavily-populated
counties. Again the political question doctrine was upheld,
as dismissal of a challenge under both the Fourteenth and
Seventeenth Amendments, the latter being raised because of
its requirement of the popular election of senators, was
affirmed.
At this point it can be seen that a continuing line of cases
had been developed establishing a supposedly strong weight
of authority for the argument that state action in distributing
voting power, even where recognizably discriminatory, was
not within the purview of federal courts. After South v. Peters
only one case involving legislative apportionment arose before
Baker v. Carr, and although remedy was awarded to dis-
franchised, de-annexed Negro citizens of Tuskegee, Alabama,
in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,17 not even this case foretold the
soon-to-arrive Baker decision. Some did, no doubt, now see
the Court moving to re-examine the non-justiciability doctrine
of Colegrove,18 but in Gomillion the Supreme Court once
again declined to consider a voting rights case under the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, al-
though finding a violation of the Fifteenth.
In Gomillion, Negro citizens of Alabama charged that
prior to their de-annexation from Tuskegee in 1957, by state
statute, the city was square, rather. than twenty-eight sided, as
afterwards, and that the effect was to remove all but a handful
of 400 previous Negro voters while not removing any white
voters. The result, they alleged, was to discriminatorily de-
prive them of their voting rights under equal protection as well
as the vote guaranty provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment.
The Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter again speaking, held that
"When a legislature thus singles out a readily isolated segment
of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment, it
violates the Fifteenth Amendment."19 Frankfurter distin-
17364 U.S. 339 (1960)..
is Note, Federal Jurisdiction - Political Question - Non-Justiciability of State
Reapportionments, 40 N.C.. REV. 131 (1961).
19 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960).
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guished this situation from the situation of disparity of popu-
lation in districts arising from population shifts in Colegrove v.
Green, which doctrine respondents here relied upon:
the Alabama Legislature has not merely redrawn the
Tuskegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to the
petitioners; it is more accurate to say that it has deprived
the petitioners of the municipal franchise and consequent
rights and to that end it has incidentally changed the city
in boundaries. While in form this is merely an act re-
defining metes and bounds, if the allegations are estab-
lished, the inescapable human effect of this essay in
geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed
voting rights. That was not Colegrove v. Green. 2 o
II.
Baker v. Carr
This was the state of the law when Baker v. Carr2l was
decided by the Supreme Court. Complainants were urban
voters in Tennessee who alleged a denial of equal protection
and due process through debasement of their voting rights,
Tennessee not having reapportioned since 1901, in violation
of the state constitution. They asked that the 1901 reappor-
tionment statute, now allegedly "invidiously discriminatory"
be declared unconstitutional and that future elections under
it be enjoined, or that elections be held at large or conducted
under a court-decreed apportionment. Although it acknowl-
edged that a violation of the state constitution had occurred,
the three-judge federal court dismissed the action. Appeal
was filed to the Supreme Court. In the words of Mr. Justice
Brennan, for the majority, the Supreme Court held:
(a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of the subject
matter;
(b) that a justiciable cause of action is stated upon which
appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief;
and
20 Id at 347.
21369 U.S. 186 (1962).
1963]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REvIEW [VOL. 4:93
(c) ... that the appellants have standing to challenge the
Tennessee apportionment statutes...
Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt
the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violation
of constitutional rights are found, it is improper now to
consider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants
prevail at the trial 22 (Emphasis added)
In finding that the case presented no nonjusticiable political
questions, Justice Brennan declared that the district court
misinterpreted Colegrove v. Green and other political question
decisions, that "neither singly nor collectively do these cases
support a conclusion that this apportionment case is non-
justiciable."23 Nonjusticiability is primarily a function of
the separation of powers, "the relationship between the
judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Govern-
ment", 24 not involved in this action regarding state activity,
he contended.
There were five additional opinions presented by the
justices, three concurring and two dissenting. Mr. Justice
Douglas, who has reaffirmed his dissenting view in Colegrove
in a concurring opinion in Gomillion, took perhaps the strongest
stand for federal court action while, although concurring, Mr.
Justice Stewart reminded that the Court had not considered
the merits of the state apportionment questions but had de-
cided only the three points above quoted from Justice Bren-
nan's opinion. Mr. Justice Clark declared that he "would not
consider intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if
there were any other relief available to the people of Ten-
nessee,"2 5 initiative and referendum not being there available.
It might be contended, therefore, that the Court decided
very little. Two of the six justices in the majority wished to
limit the ramifications of the decision, and the author of the
majority opinion failed to point to any extensive implication
22 Id. at 197-198.
23 d. at 210.
24 1bid.
25 Id. at 259.
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for the decisions in his highly legalistic essay. Therefore, no
majority supported any major doctrinal development. Dis-
tinguishing Colegrove v. Green rather that overruling it, the
court established no standards or guidelines for state and
lower federal courts-it did not even hear the case on the
merits.
But the dissenting speakers among the justices behind this
decision would be of considerable import. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, the author of the majority views in Colegrove v. Green and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, in an eloquent and lengthy statement,
saw this case as overruling Colegrove and other decisions and
he foresaw dire consequences.
The impressive body of rulings thus cast aside reflected
the... uniform course of our political history regarding
the relationship between population and legislative repre-
sentation-a wholly different matter from denial of the
franchise to individuals because of race, color, religion
or sex. Such a massive repudiation of the experience of
our whole past in asserting destructively novel judicial
doctrine demands a detailed analysis of the role of this
Court in our constitutional scheme. Disregard of inherent
limits in the effective exercise of the Court's "judicial
power" not only presages the futility of judicial interven-
tion in the essentially political conflict of forces by which
the relation between population and representation has
from time out of mind been and now is determined. It
may well impair the Court's position as the ultimate organ
of "the Supreme Law of the Land" in that vast range of
legal problems, often strongly entangled in popular feeling,
on which the Court must pronounce. 2 8
III.
The Problem of the Implementation of Baker v. Carr by the Courts
A veritable deluge of apportionment cases followed
Baker, the plaintiffs relying on the Court's ruling for the legal
force needed to require action in state courts or specially-
constituted three-judge federal courts to enforce an effective
26 Id. at 267.
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change in their state's system of representation. In Georgia a
suit was instituted within hours after the Baker announcement
to enjoin the use of the infamous County-Unit System in
Democratic Primaries; and within a short time many more
suits had been brought, seeking equitable reapportionment
in all but a few states.
Two cases, previously decided but appealed to the Supreme
Court, were shortly remanded to the courts from which they
arose for further consideration in view of the action of the
Court in the Tennessee case. In Scholle v. Hare,28 a geo-
graphical apportionment of the Michigan Senate which pro-
vided extensive overrepresentation of rural citizens had been
upheld by the state's supreme court, while in WI.M.C.A., Inc.
v. Simon,29 a federal district court dismissed an attempt to have
the apportionment provisions of the New York legislature
invalidated. On remand, the two lower courts took opposite
turns, but perhaps upon the close scrutiny requested by the
Supreme Court, they found different situations. The Michigan
Supreme Court no longer found it proper that its state senate
be disproportionately constituted and found previous Michigan
decisions upon which to rely. Yet in New York, although
representation was not perfectly distributed on the basis of
population, the federal court found that discrimination was
not extensive and that the districting plan there involved was
systematic, rational, of historical origin, and thus clearly in
line with Baker v. Carr.
It is significant to note that the Supreme Court did not
advise the lower courts to any extent in these cases. Nor has
the Court provided any guidance subsequent to its original
opinion, which chiefly held that malapportionment questions
were justiciable and that courts could consider such issues on
the merits. Thus no standards or guidelines have come down
to aid a state or federal court in determining whether a legis-
lative body that is not absolutely representative of the popu-
lation is or is not compatible with the equal protection clause.
This has been the situation: they did not know specifically
27 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
28 369 U.S. 429 (1962).
29 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
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what the law was; they only knew, clearly, that they must
hear the case! Perhaps this is what the court intended-
various courts in various states deciding the matter as it best
suited them. But this would be incongruous since there are
not many different legitimate interpretations of the same
clause of the Constitution. Thus it appears quite possible
that the Court wished to defer the establishment of standards
until it had an opportunity for consideration of the views of
many learned judges on the issues arising and, perhaps most




Certain patterns of decisions, however, seem to be clearly
indicated by the decisions subsequent to Baker v. Carr. For
example, where there has been a failure to reapportion over a
long period, contrary to the state constitution, as in Alabama3 o
and Tennessee,31 the courts will act to invalidate a present
inequitable apportionment or order reapportionment. Also,
where no rationale or formula is found to justify the present
distribution of legislative seats, the courts appear most likely
to overrule such apportionments. This was also the case in
both the Tennessee and Alabama cases. In the latter state, it
was so ruled in the case of the proposed Crawford-Webb Act,
which allotted one House of Representatives seat to each
county, then distributed the remaining thirty-nine seats ac-
cording to no understandable standard. Even in Virginia,
where there were no severe population disparities, as com-
pared to many other states, reapportionment was ordered,
primarily, it seemed, because no rational plan had been
adopted. 3 2
A number of the cases have been dismissed, the primary
causes being that no remediable discrimination was found.
Discriminationinterms of population was found but it followed
a rational plan and was not unconstitutional, or in the case
30 Sims v. Frink, 208 F.Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
31 Baker v. Carr, 206 F.Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (On remand).
32 Mann v. Davis, 213 F.Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962).
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of state courts, the court found no authority to enforce re-
apportionment. In Wright v. Rockefeller, 3 3 barely a nine per-
cent disparity from the average was found among Manhattan
congressional districts. An admittedly extraordinary basis
of districting was found in New Hampshire, in Levitt v. May-
nard. 4 Representation of units in the Senate was based upon
direct tax payments but, as the court learned upon inspection,
little inequality according to population had resulted.
Although minimal discrimination according to population
was found in New York, W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon 35 held that
it resulted from a rational basis and was not unconstitutional.
In Maryland, where lack of population equality was clear,
the court made no consideration of whether the Senate was
fairly apportioned. Dismissal was ordered on the ground that
only the Senate, which historically had represented political
units while the lower house represented the people, was
attacked. The Senate was not intended to represent the people
equally and was not unconstitutional. 36
Both the Rhode Island37 and Vermont3 8 Supreme Courts
ruled apportionment statutes unconstitutional, but each also
found the state courts had no authority in the area of reappor-
tionment. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, in Caesar v.
Wiliams3 found extensive discrimination and that it had
authority to order reapportionment, yet still did not order it.
The Court merely declared that state constitutional provisions
made some imbalance inevitable and, although much more
serious imbalance had here been created by act of the legis-
lature, the court determined to take no action until the legis-
lature had an opportunity to fully re-examine the situation.
It should be noted that Idaho has been foreseen as likely to be
a state where federal court action might overturn a state
supreme court decision.
33 311 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
34 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 (1962).
35 208 F.Supp. 368 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
3f Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Towes, 229 Md. 406, 184
A.2d 715 (1962).
37 Sweeney v. Norte, 183 A2d 296 (1962).
3S Mikell v. Rousseau, 123 Vt. 139, 183 A.2d 817 (1962).
39 9 Idaho Cap. Rep. 161, 371 P.2d 241 (1962).
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Some of the courts have quite naturally shown a marked
reluctance to step rapidly over a path formerly trod almost
exclusively by state legislatures. Judges in Sims,4o V.M.C.A.,4 1
and Baker,42 all were of the view that court action should be
held to a minimum. In Baker it was deemed to be desirable
that "there should be a minimum of judicial intrusion by
federal courts into the governmental affairs of the state." 43
Where a federal court found that a state court had the
first opportunity to take action and failed to do so, it was
held that it is now the responsibility of the federal courts to
enforce reapportionment.44 Here the Colorado Supreme
Court in In Re Legislative Apportionment45 had ruled that the
legislature had not had the full opportunity to act as permitted
by the state constitution, i.e., a full regular general session
at which to consider the problem. After declaring that the
state court had failed to act, however, this federal court noted
that new legislative elections were imminent, and rather than
enjoin them or cause utter confusion regarding them, it
determined to wait until after the November, 1962, elections
before rendering a decision on the merits. Thus a strong
possibility persists that the federaf court will here do just what
the state court is doing-wait until the legislature has another
opportunity to reapportion.
A notably strong and widespread desire has been shown
that the state legislature have the opportunity to attempt an
equitable apportionment, now that the Supreme Court has
ruled and the lower court has invalidated the state's current
allotment. The district court in Baker v. Carr left a newly-
constituted legislature, although still somewhat malappor-
tioned, with full authority to redistrict, while the Rhode
Island Supreme Court, in an Opinion to the Governor,46 held
that although malapportioned the legislatures still could act.
40 Sims v. Frink, 208 F.Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
41 W.M.C.A. v. Simon, 208 F.Supp. 368 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
42 Baker v. Carr, 206 F.Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962) (on remand).
43 Id. at 348.
44 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962).
45 374 P.2d 66 (962).
46 185 A.2d 111 (1962).
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At least three courts were so anxious that the legislature
create the new allotment, to eliminate any necessity for fur-
ther action on their part, that they offered a second oppor-
tunity to the lawmakers. 4 A number of other courts seemed
to take a similar approach.48
However, in two instances courts moved immediately to
enjoin action under invalid state law. In Michigan, the
holdings of a senatorial primary was enjoined and it was
ordered that senators be elected at large, if the legislature did
not reapportion in time.4 9 In Sanders v. Gray,5 o the court
immediately enjoined the use of the County-Unit System in
statewide Democratic Primaries in Georgia, so long as it does
not proportionately represent Georgia citizens. This system
did not apply to elections for the Georgia legislature, only
to congressional and statewide elections. However, the voting
strength allotment was based upon representation in the
lower house and although it related only to party primaries,
Georgia being among the most obvious one-party states, this
system still played a most significant role in Georgia's electoral
process. Sanders apparently ruled contra to the Supreme
Court decision of South v. Peters, on the strength of the Court's
ruling in Baker v. Carr.
V.
Court Standards
But perhaps the question that most needs to be answered
is, what standards have been set by the lower courts regarding
the extent of apportionment based on population to be re-
quired in state statutes to render them compatible with the
Baker decision. Here is where the greatest uncertainty lies,
47 State of Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F.Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962);
Mass. v. Burkhardt, 207 F.Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Lien v. Sartie,
205 F.Supp. 536 (D. N.D. 1962).
48 Sims v. Frink, 208 F.Supp. 431 (M.D. Ali. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205
F.Supp 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); In Re Legislative Apportionment, 374 P.2d
66 (1962); Caesar v. Williams, 9 Ida. Cap. Rep. 161, 371 P.2d 241
(1962).
49 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W. 2d 350 (1962). (Mr. Justice
Stewart did later stay this injunction).
50203 F.Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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as demonstrated by the obvious lack of consensus in the
views of the various courts.
Of course if a state's constitution required apportionment
based strictly on population in both houses the court would
be expected to enforce this. However, where there is no such
mandate, it still might seem an elementary question as to
whether one or both houses must equally represent the ppu-
lation. Yet there is no unanimity in answers given. At least
one house should be apportioned according to population,
as is the case in Congress, according to three courts. In
Georgia, 53 it was held that apportionment in both houses
was "invidiously" discriminatory, and at least one must be
representative of the people, quantitatively. If not, the appor-
tionment would fail to meet constitutional requirements. In
Maryland, 52 an arrangement providing that the lower house
represent the population proportionately and the senate rep-
resent local political units was held to be proper, as similar
to Congress. This also appeared to be the view of the judges
in Baker v. Carr, on remand, it being found that the constitu-
tion does not preclude some protection for less popular
governmental units.
On the other hand, several courts found that both houses
were unconstitutionally apportioned, or at least apparently
did so. 53 Several courts had under consideration only one
house, or ruled on only one house, which might appear to
imply that both houses must be proportionately representative.
In Scholle v. Hare54 districting of the Senate was invalidated,
while in Sweeney v. Notte5 the statute apportioning the Rhode
Island House of Representatives was declared unconstitutional.
Only the Senate was in question in a Vermont case, 5 6 but here
51 Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F.Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
52 Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184
A.2d 715 (1962).
53 Mann v. Davis, F.Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962); Lisco v. McNichols, 208
F.Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962); Sims v. Frink, 208 F.Supp. 431 (M.D.
Ala. 1962); Sabel v. Adams, 208 F.Supp. 316 (S.D. FIa. 1962) (held:
If the proposed Florida Constitutional amendment is passed, malappor-
tionment will no longer exist).
54 Supra note 49.
55 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (1962).
5 6Mickell v. Rousseau, 123 Vt. 139, 183 A.2d 817 (1962).
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it was pointed out that the Senate was established to give
Vermont a representative body, the House representing each
town equally, so this does not lend to the implication. In
New Hampshire,57 the House was intended to be represent-
ative of the population; the Senate, although not so intended,
was held not inequitable in regard to population.
Three courts have considered what has become recognized
as the "federal analogy", the argument that the distribution
of seats in state legislatures is not violative of "equal pro-
tection" if similar to the federal Congress in its basis, one
house representing population and the other, political units.
This approach coincides with the position of the above-
discussed three courts which found that at least one house
must be population-based. The two categories might have
been combined, although the analogy argument was discussed
in one only, the Tawess 8 case. But for those who feel that
here is a proper solution on which the states can rely to rid
them of at least some of their apportionment problem, there
is little security to offer. As stated, only three cases here
considered discussed this contention; two of these rejected
the argument. In Sims v. Frink, 5 9 it was held that the Alabama
Senate is not analogous to its United States counterpart, as
the county, in contrast to the state, is "nothing more than an
involuntary.., division of the state." 6 0 No analogy between
the United States Senate and the state senate can be made, as
state senatorial districts do not have state autonomy, the
federal court ruled in Virginia. 61 Only in Maryland has it
been held that representation according to political units in
one body and according to population in the other is entirely
proper.6 2
57Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 (1962).
58 Sapra note 52.
59 208 F.Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
60 Id. at 438.
61 Mann v. Davis, 213 F.Supp. 577 (E.D. Va. 1962) (It may be well to note
here that Virginia's Senate districts frequently cross county lines, are
subject to change upon statutory reapportionment, and therefore do not
represent separate units of government. Perhaps, therefore, the argument
could be more strongly presented in another state).
62 Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 229 Md. 406, 184
A2d 715 (1962).
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Is there, then, any standard to be found in these lower
decisions upon which one might place reliance as a test for
the legislatures in an attempt to comply with the equal pro-
tection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Is it represen-
tation strictly distributed according to population in either
one or both houses, whichever might be required? The
answer to this latter question is no, for while several courts
in their opinions have seemed to be concerned only with
population representation,63 others have found numerous
other features significant in determining whether a legislative
body is unduly discriminatory. W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon 64
lists a number of other factors which have been considered in
various cases: rationality, lack of arbitrariness, historical
basis, geographical basis, and a remedy available to the elector-
ate. In Florida, 65 geographical and historical factors, Dade
County's enormity, and the fact that special legislation is
required for changes in local government for all counties
except Dade, were all found to require consideration in addition
to population. Lund v. Mathas,66 a Florida Supreme Court
case, found that population was only one of several important
factors to be considered. No definite standards were set in
Colorado, 67 but it was indicated that the state's great area,
much of it being sparsely-settled, and the extensive geographi-
cal differences arising therefrom, were valid considerations.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court found that apportionment
along geographical, county, municipal, or urban versus rural
lines does not necessarily constitute a denial of equal pro-
tection if the rationale is justified. 6a And of course already
noted was the upholding of New Hampshire's representation
according to direct tax payments, 69 but this may be irrelevant
as the court seemed to rule for validity because the method
was not popularly discriminatory.
63 Sobel v. Adams, 208 F.Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Mass. v. Burkhardt,
207 F.Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296
(1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W. 2d 350 (1962)
(Relied on previous cases establishing a two-to-one disparity).
64 Supra note 41.
65 Sobel v. Adams, 208 F.Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
66 Lund v. Mathas, 145 So.2d 871 (1962).
6 7 Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F.Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962).
68 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (1962).
69 Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 (1962).
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VI.
Invidious Discrimination
If there is one reliable standard, it must be one which is
difficult to define and on the meaning of which it might
readily be feared the courts will vary-it may even be a major
factor behind so many varying opinions, in addition to the
factor of varying situations among the states. This standard
is invidious discrimination. This somewhat unfamiliar term
grew out of the Georgia County-Unit System cases. Mr.
Justice Douglas had proposed it as the test for non-compliance
with equal protection in his dissenting opinion in South v.
Peters. Then, in invalidating the System, Circuit Judge Bell
stated, "We think the court by its opinion in Baker v. Carr
has now adopted the ... test."70 Judge Bell quoted from
Webster's International Dictionary in defining "invidious":
1. Tending to excite odium, ill will, or envy; likely to give
offense; esp., unjustly and irritatingly discriminatory;
as invidious distinctions. 71
He then listed as tests or conditions for invidious discrimina-
tion, whether the system is rational, or is arbitrary, or has a
historical basis in American political institutions, or coincides
with the absence of political remedy, and, before federal courts
can interfere in state matters, whether the violation is clear. 7 2
Sims v. Frink applies this test, with Judge Bell's definitions,
most clearly to legislative apportionment. There the court,
speaking in July, 1962, stated:
Each of the cases which has arisen since Baker v. Carr,
supra, has agreed that the test of compliance with the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is whether the
inequality in voting power is a result of "invidious dis-
crimination".
They listed the Toombs and Moss cases, in addition to Sanders,
as being among these cases. The IV.M.C.A. case used this
70 Sanders v. Gray, 203 F.Supp. 158, 168 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
71 Id. at 168, n. 9.
72 Id. at 168-170.
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test and listed these same conditions, noting that other cases
had followed them.
VII.
Baker v. Carr and Apportionment of the House of Representatives
Did the court intend that Baker v. Carr apply to the
districting of seats in the Federal House of Representatives,
normally done within the states by state legislatures, as well?
No, said courts in Georgia73 and Florida. 74 In Wesberry v.
Vandiver, it was declared that the Court in Baker took pains
to distinguish from Colegrove. Echoing Colegrove, this court
said the courts could not interfere with the powers of a co-
ordinate body in the federal government. Although a state
supreme court spoke in Lund v. Mathas, Wesberry was followed,
and it was again held that Baker did not apply, Colegrove still
being determinative. In Wright v. Rockefeller,7 S the indication
was that the judges clearly were of the opinion that Baker
applied, as they ruled on the merits, but found no invidious
discrimination.
VIII.
Summary of the Court's Attitude Towards Baker v. Carr
In summary, it may be stated the decisions generally agree:
(1) Where there is little or no discrimination, the
courts will not act.
(2) Where there is "invidious discrimination" the
courts will invalidate state statutory or constitutional
representation provisions, and federal courts, at least, will
take steps to see to a reapportionment.
(3) The courts are, however, generally reluctant to
act drastically, and can be expected to show a strong desire
that the legislature itself act, in order that the courts can
be relieved of the task of redistricting by decree.
73 Wesberry v. Vandiver, 206 F.Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
74 Lund v. Mathas, 145 So.2d 871 (1962).
75 211 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Differences in the courts' views, which, it appears, will
remain unreconciled until the court speaks at greater length
are:
(1) the preponderance of the influence of population
over other factors in apportionment,
(2) whether one or both houses must be apportioned
according to population,
(3) whether a "federal analogy" can be found in state
legislatures, and
(4) whether Baker applies to congressional districts.
Ix.
State Government and Baker v. Carr
There are differing views regarding the effectiveness and
influence of state government as strong arguments for reappor-
tionment. It may safely be said at present that reapportion-
ment will not be the answer to all the problems of state and
local government. Executive Assistant to the Secretary of
Labor, Daniel Moynihan, has well expressed the doubt that
lingers.
General reapportionment could bring about a funda-
mental, almost constitutional, change in American govern-
ment. Or it could end up merely as more tinkering with
the machinery, as has referendum and recall. The outcome
will largely be determined by whether or not reapportion-
ment is accompanied by a revival of interest in state
government, which for half a century has declined amidst
neglect, indifference and, worse, disdain. 7.3
Even at this early stage, however, some possible repercus-
sions of the decisions can be observed. If the Court takes
this act of intervention into what was formerly regarded as the
non-justiciable political activities of the state governments as
only the first step toward extensive federal court surveillance
over state affairs, or if some lower courts are left unchecked in
76 Moynihan, The Question of the States, 77 COMMONWEAL 65 (1962).
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their interpretations of extensive authority to enforce re-
apportionment according to population in both houses, even
where conditions are quite unlike those in Tennessee, a rev-
olution in doctrine and in structure will have occurred in
American federalism. Perhaps the Court will further clarify
its views on reapportionment and when it is again asked to
intervene in other facets of the state government, it will
modify the more extensive lower decisions. If this occurs,
then perhaps little long-run change will result in the horizontal
distribution of powers in our system.
Most so-called political "conservatives" or "States Right-
ists" would surely not oppose the reversal of the trend toward
centralism or the rebirth of state governments. Many of them
would probably not disagree with the contention that the
best argument against federal encroachment in an area of
activity formerly operated in exclusively by the states is
adequate fulfillment of the need for government participation
by the state government. But when the federal government
is seen as revitalizing the state governments by ordering
them to act otherwise than they have been, the question arises
as to whether or not it is actually refurbishing the power of the
states or is it further extending the arm of centralism? If the
decision is interpreted as the latter, it may even be unrealistic
to think of the states, in mid-twentieth century, as "viable
political entities with independent or even quasi-independent
roles of their own." 7 7
Some writers see such a constitutional revolution as a
possible outgrowth of this case. For example, Stanley H.
Friedelbaum has stated:
... [F]or all that has been written on the subject,
the issues go deeper than malapportionment and, in many
respects, the Court's reversal of long-standing policy in
Baker may rank with that effected in the School Desegregation
cases. The latter foreshadowed a social revolution under
the guise of a modification in judicial doctrines. The
former could prepare the way for an equally momentous
political upheaval in the traditional fabric of American
7 7 Wheeler and Bebout, After Reapportionment, 51 NAT. CIV. REV. 246
(1962).
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federalism. Some form of intervention in state affairs
undoubtedly has been accepted by the Court as a necessity
to insure urban voters an adequate voice in councils long
dominated by the rural minorities. Such action would
seem to turn upon an assertion of federal supremacy in a
matter intimately related to the basic structure of the
legislatures. 7 8
Certainly one result will be activity with new strength of
purpose by state legislatures to reapportion themselves, as has
already occurred. Already it has been shown that legislatures
will act when there is fear of judicial intervention, caused by
the pendency of a case, a ruling invalidating a prior statute, or,
merely an anticipation that a remedy will be sought in the
courts.
One of the anticipated results, in the minds of the justices
making the decision, probably was that state legislatures
would be influenced to redistrict without the necessity of
further action. Perhaps this was a major reason why no specific
remedy was outlined in the original decision: the court hoped
none would be necessary. It should be remembered that the
Court did not hold that courts are the only appropriate
instruments to reform electoral inequities; it merely declared
that legislatures are no longer free to maintain them. The
Court invites state legislative action, but says the federal district
court can act if they do not. 7 9 Still, the district courts have
been most anxious that the legislatures comply and not make
necessary an apportionment by them.
X.
Effects of Baker v. Carr on the Urban Electorate
If reapportionment will not solve all the state's problems,
will it be a panacea for the cities? A widespread attitude has
been that it would, because the rural areas held the majority
in so many legislative bodies and had lost population very
rapidly in recent decades, thereby becoming over-repre-
78 Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and
Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L.REV. 673 (1962).
79 Katzenbach, Some Reflections on Baker v. Carr, 15 VAND. L.REV. 829
(1962).
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sented. 8 0 However, it is common knowledge that in recent
years the large cities have been losing population unless
they annexed suburban territory. Therefore, if there had
been no reapportionment, city residents were in all likelihood
becoming better represented. Population growth has come
into sprawling, well-to-do, politically disorganized suburbia.
Here are the areas of "chief injustice". They are, in most
cases, entirely separate political units from the city, and with
problems in many cases surely quite unrelated to those of the
city. With cities, proper, or what today are often called core
cities-the strictly urban political units-levelling off or even
losing population, urban problems may not be nearer solution
because of reapportionment. "Important for city fathers to
recognize is that minority status within the state legislature
is likely to remain permanent whether reapportionment takes
place or not." 81
In any case, it is questionable whether urban legislators
cannot already gain passage of needed legislation if they are
really convinced it is needed. In an exhaustive study of two
of the larger states, one unimetropolitan (Illinois-Chicago)
and one bimetropolitan (Missouri-St. Louis and Kansas City),
Indiana University political scientist, David R. Derge, arrived
at three major conclusions, supporting the argument that urban
legislators could already gain passage of legislation if they
concertedly sought passage:
1. Non-metropolitan legislators seldom vote together
with high cohesion against metropolitan legislators.
2. Metropolitan legislators usually do not vote togeth-
er with high cohesion.
3. Metropolitan legislators are usually on the prevail-
ing side when they do vote together with high cohesion.82
Derge declared that his study showed "the city's bitterest
opponents in the legislature are political opponents from within
80 Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAW
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 329 (1962).
81 Friedman, Reapportionment Myth, 49 NAT. CIV. REV. 184, 188 (1960).
82 Derge, Metropolitan and Oatstate Alignments in Illinois and Missouri Legis-
lative Delegations, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1051, 1065 (1958).
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its own walls, and those camped in the adjoining suburban
areas." 83
Other writers have been led to question whether or not
there is an urban interest, 84 as opposed to a rural interest,
in state legislatures. It is questionable whether the city leaders
would vote for measures to benefit the city when a majority
of them were placed in the legislature, and according to current
population-shift trends, they are not likely to be. Conse-
quendy, the effect on the larger cities will probably not give
the urban electorate the power to dictate to the rural electorate
as had been originally forecast.
XI.
Future Development of the Doctrine Enunciated by Baker v. Carr
Just as the lower courts in considering the cases subsequent
to Baker v. Carr, have been unable to state with assurance
what the Court intended as the proper limits of judicial action,
or the proper course for courts to take in determining the
fairness of an apportionment, or even to create uniform
standards for themselves in the interim until the courts speak
more clearly, so it is not possible here to predict what the
Court will eventually declare that judges can do in assuring
reapportionment. It is even difficult to arrive at a determination
of what the courts should do in evaluating apportionment, now
that it has been adjudged that this is a justiciable question.
However, as it is clear that the states should be permitted to
conduct their own redistricting if they will, and the courts
have indicated a strong desire that they do so; that this is an
area of activity that lends itself more to legislative action
than to judicial; that circumstances and laws will be somewhat
different in each state; and that there are as yet no established
standards or precedents on which courts might rely.
Most authorities who thus far have spoken have indicated
strong reasons why a course of restraint should be followed by
the courts. Professor McCloskey finds that there are two
831bid.
84 Young, The 1958 Special Session of the Missouri General Assembly, MO.
POL. SCI. ASSN. NEWSLETTER, No. 3 (1958); Wheeler and Bebout,
supra, note 77 at 248.
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standards which might be adopted: the "procedural" in which
the inquiry is "whether the ultimate constituent power was
being allowed an adequate opportunity to express itself, and the
qualitative consideration of the actual apportionment, in which
the courts would decide the extent of departure from a norm
of equality which would be permitted."85 McCloskey pro-
vides a convincing argument that only the first course should
be followed. The states have responded to the decision with
an "astonishing spirit of compliance" indicating widespread
popular acceptance, which is a surprising and desirable re-
action to Court action. If the courts risk overextending the
intervention doctrine, however, this present acceptance may
quickly wither, the spirit of cooperation disappear, and
tedious litigation may be necessary to force any state action.
Furthermore, if the courts are to intervene in situations where
there is a popular remedy, the courts will be in the business of
making value judgments. They will have to become experts
on political matters and on the environment, traditions, history,
geography, etc., of the states, and will surely become legis-
lators superior to the state tribunals more so than judges.a a
McCloskey's argument is eloquent, but it must be ad-
mitted that initiative would be successful only where there is
a desire for equitable representation by the majority. It is
reasonable to agree that in such a case the courts might hear
the minority argument, but again, they will have difficulty in
arriving at a standard to require as a guarantee of "equal
protection of the laws". State constitutional requirements
could here well be utilized as a standard for the courts, unless
it is clear that no guarantee of protection for the minority
can be gathered from the constitutional provisions for the
legislature. If, then, the state constitutional provisions required
that both houses be reapportioned after each decennial census,
and that this reapportionment be based on population, the
federal courts could require that this be followed, if there is
not substantial compliance as the people's chosen standard
of equal protection. Where, however, the constitution requires
that only one house be reapportioned according to population
shifts, and the method provided for the other house is being
85 McCloskey, Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 73 (1962).
86Id. at 74.
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followed by the legislature, the courts could leave the matter
to popular processes of change, if one is desired. Friedelbaum
has suggested this approach:
It would seem that whenever "invidious discrimi-
nation", "irrationality", arbitrary or capricious action,
or inaction are found to exist, primary consideration
should be given to the likelihood of effecting revision
within the state's existing constitutional structure. A
judicial requirement of "reasonable" adherence to the
state's self-imposed standards for periodic apportionment
is a first step. Incursions upon state constitutions should
be restricted to the most flagrant violations lest the states
be forced to a rigid and barren sameness in their represent-
ative systems. Decisions of this nature call for a most
discreet and remorseful exercise of the Court's judgment. 87
Where no provisions are to be found in the state constitu-
tion for legislative reapportionment, or where there is no
rationale for the apportionment provided which the courts
can interpret as providing equal protection, the courts might
require that in establishing the apportionment by statute or
otherwise, a distribution be made according to a stated
formula or pattern which would rationally and reasonably
represent the state's citizens. Then the courts could look to
this standard to determine whether such rational representation
was being provided.
The final test provided in Sanders v. Gray8 8 for determining
whether invidious discrimination exists, that it must be a clear
case of discrimination, should be adopted as a standard test
by the courts. Every encouragement should continue to be
provided for the legislature to reapportion itself. This, how-
ever, will not lead to a perfectly equitable solution in all cases,
as legislators are quite as hesitant to make drastic changes in
some matters as are judges. This is particularly true when
they are asked to eliminate their own job or influence, or that
of their colleagues.
87 Friedelbaum, supra, note 78 at 699.
8S 203 F.Supp. 158, 170 (N.D. Ga. 1962).
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. . . [S]ince actual apportionment decisions are usually
made by legislative bodies elected on a previous appor-
tionment system, they inevitably involve the elements
of arbitrary choice, popular cynicism, and possible effects
upon the distribution of seats and party strength. Hence
the incumbent representatives and party organizations are
apt to approach the problem of apportionment with
distaste, to say the least. 89
Recognizing these difficulties, the courts should be pre-
pared to approve reasonable attempts at solution. If the
legislature fails to reapportion at all, which is unlikely, or if
their product is found to be unreasonable, then the courts
should ask the legislature to try again, if no other state body
or official has reapportionment power. They should be
prepared to call on -the governor to call special sessions for
this purpose and, perhaps, should threaten to require elections
at large, if redistricting is not enacted by a specific date, before
considering the involved, non-judicially compatible, and
possibly regrettable remedy of themselves providing a re-
distribution of seats. A court-ordered at-large election of
state legislators may be a "highly questionable device",o
but surely it is preferable to a court-produced apportionment.
It has been clearly demonstrated that "passage of a fair appor-
tionment and districting statute is likely to follow immediately
a court order requiring all of a state's legislators to be elected
at-large." 9 1
Again, recognizing the desire of judicial restraint and the
state legislators' difficulties, it might be well if the courts do
not undertake a program of promoting equality, as the great
difficulties of court-legislating will surely arise in such an
effort, but instead adopt a "principle of negating proven
instances of egregiously unreasonable apportionment pat-
terns."92 This might be merely a small extension of their
89 LEISERSON, PARTIES AND POLITICS; AN INSTITUTIONAL AND
BEHAVIORAL APPROACH, 108-109 (1958).
9 0 Dixon, supra, note 80 at 381.
91 Silva, Legislative Reresentatio--IVith Special Reference to New York, 27
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 408, 432 (1962).
92 Dixon, supra, note 80 at 383.
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long-established practice of negating new apportionment
statutes which are not in compliance with legal requirements. 9 3
Even before recent federal court action state officials had
been grappling with apportionment problems for a long time.
Now they have the additional problem of avoiding being
hauled into court and perhaps ordered to act in accordance
with court dictates, or having statutes thrown out and having
to create entirely new representation systems. This is not to
imply that the net effect of court activity will necessarily be
bad, as it may well provide a major impetus toward the more
or less permanent solution of many of the pre-existing prob-
lems. But, in order to avoid the perennial wrangling that takes
place after the release of new census figures every ten years,
extensive measures may be necessary.
Most likely to aid in solutions of these problems would be
action to decrease the influence or discretion of legislators
over their own reapportionment. Earlier indicated was the
problem that legislators are too influenced by their personal
attitudes and outside pressures to do the job well and promptly.
One report stated it in these words:
To ask the General Assembly to consider its own
basis of apportionment is to ask a man to judge his own
case. He can scarcely rise above his own interest if he does,
and he cannot escape the charge of bias however he decides.
It is not fair to impose even a moral responsibility for
such a judgment on the principal party at interest. 94
Yet the fact is that most state constitutions do provide for
reallotment of seats by the legislature.
Many proposals have been made for reform of apportion-
ment laws and a number have been tried. It does not seem
that any one proposed solution can clearly be held preferable
93 While perhaps not proposing such extensive restraint as that espoused by
the quoted authorities, other recent writers have also foreseen considerable
potential difficulty for the courts if they are to attempt a qualitative analy-
sis of state apportionment programs. See, e.g., Bikell, The Durability of
Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE LJ. 39 (1962).
94 Commission on State Government Organization, Report to the General
Assembly and Governor of Connecticut, 55 (1950).
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to all others, nor that a specific program would work in all
states. However, each state should require in its constitution
a reapportionment after each census. Furthermore, dear,
systematic, and reasonable step-by-step programs should be
outlined under which the legislature or other body or officials
can more or less act automatically. In addition, if the legis-
lature is first called upon to act and an automatic or specific
mathematical formula is not provided, a non-legislative body
should be empowered to act in case the legislative body does
not.
A few states today make apportionment compulsory,or
and at least one, Arizona, makes it automatic.96 These
generally have a fairly specific formula by which the reap-
portionment is to be made. Some specifically delegate to
the state courts power to review reapportionment statutes. 97
The constitutions of the new states of Alaska and Hawaii,
formed after extensive consultation with American political
and state government experts, placed on executive-adminis-
trative officials responsibility to reapportion, with provision
that their acts or omission to act could be challenged in the
courts. 9 8 Several older states have also adopted the apportion-
by-commission (or executive official) approach, either giving
the initial responsibility to a non-legislative body, as in
Missouri, or turning the matter over to some other group only
if the legislature fails, as in Illinois., 9 Perhaps the strongest
constitutional order requiring reapportionment is found in a
1945 constitutional amendment in Florida's document, in a
requirement that if the legislature fails to reapportion, the
Governor shall call a special session "and such extraordinary
session called for reapportionment shall not be limited to
95 Bone, States Attempting to Comply with Reapportionment Requirements,
171 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 387, 411 (1952).
96 Harvey, Reapportionment of State Legislatures-Legal Requirements, 17
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 364, 369 (1952).
97 Id. at 373.
98 See Quinn, Hawaii, The Aloha State, 32 STATE GOVT. 146 (1960);
Egan, The Constitution of the New State of Alaska, 31 STATE GOVT.
209, 213 (1959).
9 9 Daver and Kelsey, Unrepresentative States, 44 NAT. MUNIC. REV. 571,
575 (1955); See also, Harvey, supra, note 96 at 369; Bone, supra, note
95 at 413.
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expire at the end of twenty days or at all, 10 0 until reapportion-
ment is effected, and shall consider no business other than
such reapportionment." 101
In conclusion, it is reiterated that no one method of
solution can be said to be most workable in all situations. It
is obvious from the foregoing that there are many possible
avenues for the states to explore. The primary objective is to
prod the lawmakers and remove discretion and opportunity
for criticism from them. Probably, the best solution is to
turn the reapportionment mandate over to another body
entirely.
100 Emphasis added.
101 FLA. CONST., Art. VII, §§ 3, 4; Bone, supra note 95 at 403.
